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Exploring the nexus between human capital, corporate governance and performance: 
Evidence from Islamic banks 
Abstract 
This paper offers novel insight into the Islamic banking business model by considering the 
effect of investments in human capital and corporate governance features on the market 
performance of Islamic banks. Based on a sample of 47 banks (30 full-fledged Islamic banks 
and 17 Islamic Shariah-windows) operating in different regions during the 2005-2010 period, 
and controlling for firm-specific characteristics, this paper finds investments in human capital 
to have a significant positive impact on the market value in the pre- and post-financial crisis 
period. Based on a market measure, this paper finds board size and CEO power to have a 
significant positive impact, while the size of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) has the 
opposite effect on market performance. The results further reveal that the Islamic banking 
sector is not a homogeneous group, with full-fledged Islamic banks having lax corporate 
governance mechanisms and large size, while their counterparts, Islamic Shariah-windows, 
having strong corporate governance mechanisms tend to invest more in human capital to 
yield positive market value. Overall, the analysis suggests that the financial crisis may have 
further spurred the impact of investments in human capital on the market performance. 
Keywords: human capital investment; corporate governance; market performance; financial 
crisis; Islamic banks; applied ethics. 
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1. Introduction 
The world has witnessed various evolutionary stages in the field of banking and finance. An 
overall slowdown in the financial markets around the globe has been observed during the 
recent financial crisis of 2007-2008, which shook the foundations of the centuries-old 
financial system and has led to doubts regarding the proper functioning of the conventional 
banking model (Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013). There have been calls for radical changes in the 
existing financial system. While the radical transformation may threaten the profitability and 
survival of existing incumbent conventional banks (CBs), it may also lead a cohort of new 
opportunities and powerful new players such as Islamic banks (IBs) into the limelight as 
possible and viable alternatives. 
Driven by religious business ethics, IBs entered the financial sector in mid-1970’s 
to provide banking solutions that comply with Islamic jurisprudence (Shariah) which 
prohibits the charging of interest (riba), engaging in speculative transactions (gharar) and 
financing of specific illicit activities (Beck et al., 2013). Shariah places strong emphasis on 
justice and fairness and as such, encourages the sharing of profit and loss and thus risk-
sharing, as well as requires all transactions to be backed by a real economic transaction that 
involves tangible assets. For IBs, their revenue streams come mainly from investment, trade-
based profit and fee-based services. Besides deposit products (savings and investment 
accounts), their asset-side products can be either equity-based such as mudarabah (capital-
labour partnership or joint venture) and musharakah (capital-capital partnership), or interest-
free debt-based products like murabahah (cost-plus sale) and ijarah (leasing). Hence, the 
Islamic banking business model is clearly different from conventional banking model as it is 
faith-driven which strives to conduct its operations in an ethical manner with an ethical 
identity and must be Shariah-compliant (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). 
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Since its inception about half a century ago, Islamic banking and finance has 
grown unabatedly; it is now considered one of the fastest growing segments in the field of 
finance (see Abedifar et al., 2016; Olson and Zoubi, 2016). According to the World Islamic 
Banking Competitiveness Report, Islamic banking is growing at a rate of 15% to 20% per 
annum globally with assets held by Islamic banks set to achieve USD 2 trillion (Nazim and 
Bennie, 2016). Furthermore, the superior performance of the Islamic finance industry during 
the global financial crisis, in which the credit and asset growth of IBs were at least twice that 
of CBs, has garnered increased focus on the Islamic banking business model 
Despite their impressive growth, IBs cannot remain complacent, as competition in the 
banking sector has intensified over the past decade (Ariss, 2010). Hence, it is imperative for 
IBs to consider embracing new strategic priorities and putting in place appropriate 
mechanisms that will help sustain their performance. 
This infers that, to sustain the current robust growth, IBs need to develop new 
products to fulfil the increasing needs of their clients. Such product innovation requires 
higher knowledge resources, particularly human intellectual capital, to execute innovative 
ideas and convert them into tangible assets. Therefore, it is argued that the strength of Islamic 
banking business model lies in its distinct knowledge base driven from the principles of 
Shariah, which can be purposefully mobilised to sustain competitive advantage in the market 
(Keenan and Aggestam, 2001). Thus, human capital is the catalyst of competitive advantage 
for IBs and these banks are expected to invest more in their stocks of human capital in order 
to maintain their ethical identity as well as sustain the ongoing robust growth trends. 
Research in human resource management clearly indicates that investing in human capital 
can yield better firm performance (Becker and Huselid, 2006; Morris et al., 2017; Subramony 
et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2009), and some studies urged governing bodies to adopt investment 
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strategies that increase and retain firm-specific human capital (Crook et al., 2011; Peña and 
Villasalero, 2010). 
Bank performance relies profoundly on good governance mechanisms to constrain 
agency problems and moral hazard. This aspect has garnered substantial attention, 
particularly following the financial crisis (Aebi et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Wintoki 
et al., 2012). Studies examining the relationship between governance mechanisms and the 
performance of conventional banks (see Adams and Mehran, 2012; Andres and Vallelado, 
2008; Francis et al., 2012) have commonly considered board size, board independence and 
CEO role duality. However, the impacts of these aspects on performance in previous studies 
were not clear. While CBs adopt a single layer governance mechanism, IBs have an 
additional layer of governance in the form of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). The SSB 
provides oversight on commitments to ethical practices (Choudhury and Hoque, 2013; 
Safieddine, 2009), such as avoiding speculation in lending and investment activities, that may 
subsequently affect performance (Al-Suhaibani and Naifar, 2014; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 
This finding highlights the complexity of the Islamic banking business model and the 
significance of human capital at the governance and operational levels. Hence, to satisfy their 
clientele, IBs require an ambidextrous stock of human capital that not only possesses 
contemporary knowledge of economics but also Shariah knowledge. Thus, IBs are expected 
to invest more in their human capital to yield profitability and market valuation. However, 
this aspect has largely been ignored by previous research in this area. Understanding whether 
human capital has a significant effect on the likelihood of IB survival and how this effect 
differs during a time of financial turmoil is an important detail for governing bodies in 
particular, which are weighing the level and other specifics of human capital requirements to 
achieve the desired level of banking stability. 
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Therefore, this paper addresses a lacuna in the bank performance literature by 
focusing on the impact of investments in human capital and the corporate governance 
mechanism on the market performance of IBs while controlling for bank-specific 
characteristics. This paper contributes to the literature on banking in several ways. First, this 
is the first cross-country study to examine the influence of investment in human capital and 
the corporate governance structure on the market-based performance of Islamic banks. 
Second, this study constructs a unique database using hand-collected data on investments in 
human capital, which has not been done in previous research. Finally, this study argues that 
Islamic banking is not a homogeneous group as considered by earlier research. In examining 
the effect of human capital investments and corporate governance on performance, this study 
also extends pooled sample estimations by splitting the sample into full-fledged Islamic 
banks and Islamic Shariah-windows in three different periods i.e., before, during, and after 
the financial crisis. In a cross-country environment, these extended analyses capture several 
interesting findings. 
 
2. Background 
An emerging body of literature has attempted to identify and examine distinct features of the 
Islamic banking model and has performed comparative analysis with rival conventional 
banks. The aspects investigated include, but are not limited to, asset quality (Beck et al., 
2013), stability (Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Hasan and Dridi, 2010), efficiency (Bourkhis and 
Nabi, 2013), valuation (Elnahass et al., 2014), risk (Abedifar et al., 2013), relationship 
banking (Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü, 2011), mutual funds (Abdelsalam et al., 2014), 
mortgage loans (Ebrahim, 2009) and other risk dimensions such as loan default rates (Baele 
et al., 2014). The empirical literature submits significant differences between conventional 
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and Islamic banks in terms of their performance efficiency during the financial crisis, in 
which the latter outperformed the former. 
While the financial crisis accorded Islamic banking an opportunity to prove its 
resilience, it also highlighted the need to address important challenges confronting the 
industry. Ordinarily Islamic banks are perceived as intermediary financial institutions; 
however, unlike conventional banks, financial intermediation is not the ultimate goal for 
Islamic finance. Islamic banking has emerged as a potential alternative ethical method of 
banking and finance, shaped by the ontological and epistemological sources of Islam 
(Platonova et al., 2016). Such institutions came into existence to provide ethical/cooperative 
financial solutions to society and are not subject to any ethnic group. Therefore, such 
institutions are expected to be more innovative in providing alternate banking solutions. 
Sorescu and Spanjol (2008) note that firm value increases with innovation breakthroughs, 
which ultimately positively affect firm market valuation. In service firms such as banks, 
much of the organisational knowledge resides within its stock of human capital, and service 
innovation tends to emanate from such knowledge (Kor and Mahoney, 2005). Thus, product 
and service innovation is primarily dependent on an organisation’s stock of human capital 
(Prajogo et al., 2016). 
Human capital is highly significant to IBs, as these financial institutions are unique 
and differ fundamentally from their conventional counterparts, which are mainly focused on 
profit maximisation through the spread between the interest rates (i.e., interest rate received 
from the capital borrowers and interest rate paid to the depositors) (Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 
2015). Conversely, IBs focus primarily on non-interest income activities such as investments 
in various Shariah-compliant projects to earn profit. Hence, IBs require multitalented human 
capital to run their operations in a Shariah-compliant manner. Thus, such institutions are 
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expected to invest relatively more to nourish their stock of human capital to meet the ethical 
commitments underlying their ethical business model. 
 
2.1 Development of hypotheses 
2.1.1 Firm resources and competitive advantage 
Proponents of human capital theory (e.g., Becker, 1975; Schultz, 1961) opine that firms 
constantly strive to generate and maintain competitive advantage by investing either in 
internal stock of knowledge assets i.e. training (Hatch and Dyer, 2004) or in acquiring 
external experts i.e. direct recruit (Thornhill, 2006). Firms learn when they expand or upgrade 
their knowledge stocks. For example, training stimulates internal flows of knowledge and 
guides future actions, without constraining them (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). This increases 
the distribution of knowledge across organisational members, facilitates the emergence of 
common meanings, and enables existing capabilities to be synthesised and reconfigured 
(Galunic and Rodan, 1998). Similarly, newly acquired external knowledge through 
recruitment allows the firm to restructure their knowledge portfolios and achieve important 
synergies from their knowledge assets (Zahra and George, 2002). Newly hired employees 
bring fresh knowledge and perspectives, which broadens understanding, sharpens problem-
solving skills, and facilitates learning (Kor and Mahoney, 2005). Thus, firms’ competitive 
capabilities stem from unique combinations of nourishing existing and acquiring new 
knowledge assets (Afuah, 2002). The empirical evidence clearly suggests that investing in 
human capital can yield positive performance outcomes (Becker and Huselid, 2006; 
Subramony et al., 2008). 
 
2.1.2 Human capital investments (HCI) and performance 
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Human capital is a critical organisational capability that corresponds directly to the 
propensity to service innovativeness to satisfy customer needs and improve firm value 
(Dotzel et al., 2013). Colombo and Grilli (2005) suggest that firms with greater human capital 
stocks (i.e., higher education or skill) are likely to have better entrepreneurial judgements, 
and, as long as human capital continues to be developed, staff can improve their job 
performance and ultimately improve the firm’s performance (Hsu, 2007). This inference also 
finds support in other literature streams. Human capital theorists (e.g., Becker, 1964; Schultz, 
1961) for instance, simply reason that an increase in worker’s skills, knowledge, and abilities 
most likely translates into increased organisational performance. 
It has been argued that a firm’s knowledge essentially resides within its human 
capital, and that firm performance tends to emanate from such knowledge (Kor and 
Mahoney, 2005). Thus, when organisations build a specific asset (i.e., human capital) 
consisting of knowledge and skills relating to creativity and development of new ideas, it 
results in an increase in firm performance (Prajogo et al., 2016). Therefore, governing bodies 
must understand the means to effectively harness and leverage their stock of human capital, 
such as constantly investing in human capital resources (Kor and Mahoney, 2005) to attain 
and sustain a competitive advantage in the market (Grant, 1996). This finding infers that 
investments in human capital are tied to higher efficiency of human capital, which, in turn, 
positively affects organisational performance. 
Theory at both the micro and macro level predicts that a firm’s willingness and ability 
to make investments in human capital enables the firm to appropriate much of the value 
created by this human capital (Crook et al., 2011; Molloy and Barney, 2015). This 
assumption has been tested empirically at national and sectoral level. Bryant and Javalgi 
(2016) investigated the impact of total investment in human capital and global economic 
integration in developed and developing economics and reported that nations that invest 
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heavily in their pool of human capital attain higher economic growth. Similarly, Effiok et al. 
(2012) found that greater level of economic growth in Nigeria was directly related to the 
investments in human capital. Using the same basic argument, O’Mahony (2012) found that 
human capital formation in the form of continuous learning, contributes significantly to  
nation’s economic growth within Europe; Galor and Moav (2004) found that human capital 
accumulation (training and recruitment) was a prime engine of national economic growth. 
This finding is supported by other empirical studies at sectoral level in the service sector. 
Úbeda-García et al. (2013), for example, submits that investment in human capital 
training helps a firm to achieve a differential positioning within the sector. Their study 
reported a significant positive relationship between investments in training programmes and 
overall performance i.e., productivity, profitability and customer satisfaction within the hotel 
industry. A later study by Úbeda-García et al. (2014) confirmed these findings. Similarly, 
Bosma et al. (2004) submit that investments in human capital have a direct significant impact 
on the profitability and survival likelihood of Dutch start-up firms. 
In the financial sector, Peña and Villasalero (2010), for instance, analysed the 
investment strategies of 202 Spanish banks in relation to market changes. They found a 
positive relationship between investments in staff training and financial performance. They 
further reported that banks that invest heavily in training and staff development favour 
internal promotions and thus achieve higher employee retention rates. Saá et al. (2004) 
analysed the strategic development on human capital within savings banks in Spain and 
reported that banks that developed their pool of human capital through training and 
development achieved superior levels of productivity and profitability. Similarly, Bartel 
(2004) reported a significant positive relationship between investment in human capital and 
growth rate of deposit and loans of US retail banks. 
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Conversely, Blatter et al (2012) argues that firms no longer rely solely on continuing 
to develop existing human capital through training programmes as they seek alternatives to 
implement simultaneously. With the rapidly changing globalised world, the demands for 
skilled human capital-related skills and knowledge have also changed. Consequently, firms 
must frequently hire new workers who match the job profile. Hence, the cost of hiring new 
workers will be considered an investment rather than an expense. Saks and Burke‐Smalley 
(2014) observed that external (direct recruitment cost) and internal (on-the-job training) 
investments help the firm to develop a strong pool of human capital, which has a strong 
positive impact on the firm’s overall performance. 
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that investments in human capital have the 
potential to be a competitive advantage for a firm and may enhance a firm’s performance 
(Morris et al., 2017). According to Wang et al. (2009), when demand for human capital is 
high in the market, firms tend to invest more in their human capital, both internally (through 
training and development programmes to retain employees) and externally (by hiring 
individuals who possess required knowledge and skills), to sustain the growth trends. This 
finding is particularly important for knowledge-intensive firms such as banks that 
continuously rely on disruptive innovations to sustain a competitive advantage in today’s 
knowledge-intensive era (Prajogo et al., 2016). As noted earlier, the Islamic finance industry 
is experiencing tremendous growth while competing in a competitive market where demand 
for skilled human capital is high (Ariss, 2010). Thus, Islamic banks need to invest in internal 
and external human capital resources to sustain the current growth trends (Hasan and Dridi, 
2010).  From an Islamic perspective, a revealing indicator of an organisation’s ethical stand is 
the way it treats its employees. The underlying philosophy and ethical values of Islamic 
banking business model encourage such institutions to achieve consistency between the brand 
values and staff behaviour by offering those adequate opportunities to develop i.e. training to 
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equip them with knowledge and understanding of IB business model in order to maintain 
their ethical identity (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). 
For IBs, human capital is important, as employees are expected not only to have 
conventional knowledge and skills related to the provision of such services but also to have 
good knowledge on Shariah law, as this will enhance the credibility and reputation of IBs. 
IBs, like other service firms, utilise the knowledge, skills and abilities of their frontline 
employees to generate unique and imperfectly imitable effective service delivery (Skaggs and 
Youndt, 2004), which, in turn, creates a competitive advantage for them. Therefore, knowing 
how investments in human capital affect an IB’s market valuation is of paramount 
importance. Thus, the resource-based view of the firm leads to the following hypothesis (H1): 
H1: there is a significant positive relationship between investments in human capital 
and the market performance of Islamic banks. 
 
2.1.3 Corporate governance and performance 
2.1.3.1 Board size and bank performance 
While there are suggestions for finding an association between board size and corporate 
performance, no consensuses exist regarding the direction of this association. Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) reported a U-shaped relationship between board size and bank performance, 
indicating that an increase in the number of board members enhances the performance of 
banks; however, when the board size becomes very large, this can have an adverse effect on 
performance due to high information asymmetries among the board members. Adams and 
Mehran (2012) argued that board size relates positively with financial returns (ROA) and 
market value (Tobin’s Q), whereas Pathan and Faff (2013) reported a negative association 
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between board size and economic performance of banks. In contrast, Wintoki et al. (2012) 
did not find a significant relationship between board size and firm performance. 
In the context of Islamic banks, large boards may negatively affect performance due 
to high coordination costs as the banks already must incur additional cost for another layer of 
gatekeepers in the form of SSB. Conversely, larger boards may provide balance for effective 
decision making beyond religious matters. Based on these arguments, the second hypothesis 
H2a, along with the competing hypothesis H2b, can be defined as: 
H2a-b: An increase in the number of board members could have a positive (negative) 
effect on the market performance of Islamic banks. 
 
2.1.3.2 Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) and bank performance 
The central feature of Islamic banks is the presence of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB), 
consisting of a group of scholars who specialise in Shariah and occasionally have a 
background in Islamic economics and finance (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). The prime 
obligations of SSB include: 1) ensuring that all contracts are Shariah-compliant; 2) helping to 
mitigate the effects of potential risk through due diligence by abiding by the ethical 
foundations of Islamic moral economy; 3) performing a Shariah audit to satisfy stakeholders 
that the bank does not operate as an ex-post compliance medium (Ullah et al., 2012) (); and 4) 
issuing fatawa (religious verdicts) to create confidence with respect to Shariah compliance 
(Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Safieddine, 2009;). 
Given the important role of the SSB for Islamic banks, a larger SSB may enhance 
bank performance through better monitoring of the activities and constraining excessive risk-
taking behaviour of the boards. Arguably, stakeholders may perceive a larger SSB to be an 
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extra expense in the presence of a larger and independent board. Based on these arguments, 
the next hypothesis H3a, together with the opposing hypothesis H3b, can be defined as: 
H3a-b: An increase in the number of SSB members could have a positive (negative) 
effect on the market performance of Islamic banks. 
 
2.1.3.3 CEO power (role duality) and bank performance 
Role duality diminishes board independence and reduces proper execution of the oversight 
role of the boards (Krause et al., 2014) and provides more power to the CEO in decision 
making, which may have a negative effect on performance. The prior research on corporate 
governance suggests that the board's monitoring efficiency is enhanced when the CEO has 
limited power in influencing the board's agendas and actions (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). For 
instance, Pathan (2009) reported that role-duality decreases risk-taking and could improve 
bank performance, whereas Mishra and Nielsen (2000) found a negative relationship between 
role-duality and financial returns. The arguments, taken together, indicate that the relation 
between CEO power and performance appears to be ambiguous. The fourth hypothesis H4a, 
together with the opposing hypothesis H4b, can be defined as: 
H4a-b: CEO power could have a positive (negative) impact on the market performance 
of Islamic banks. 
 
2.1.3.4 Board composition and bank performance 
The results for the relationship between bank performance and board independence are also 
inconclusive. For instance, Pathan and Faff (2013) posited that a higher fraction of 
independent board directors (non-executive director, NED) on the board dampens bank 
performance. Similarly, Erkens et al. (2012) observed a negative relationship between board 
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independence and the performance of 296 banks across 30 countries over the 2007–2008 
period. Conversely, Tanna et al. (2011) and Busta (2007) reported a positive relationship 
between board composition and the performance of UK and European banks, respectively. In 
contrast, Choi and Hasan (2005) were unable to find any statistical significance between 
board independence and the performance of Korean banks. 
In the context of Islamic banking, the monitoring and advisory functions by non-
executive directors may not be as important as the role played by the SSB, which legitimises 
the activities of the bank. As such, having more non-executive directors adds costs to the 
bank, which, in turn, may have a negative effect on performance. Conversely, non-executive 
directors may have expertise in certain operational areas as well as social and business 
networks and contacts that the banks need to achieve their strategic objectives. The above 
reasoning appears compelling; hence, the fifth hypothesis H5a, along with the opposing 
hypothesis H5b, can be formulated as: 
H5a-b: An increase in the proportion of independent directors could have a positive 
(negative) impact on the market performance of Islamic banks. 
 
2.1.3.5 Audit committee and bank performance 
The role of audit committees in banks cannot be underestimated, as they oversee the financial 
reporting and accounting activities, monitor the effectiveness of the internal control system, 
and oversee the role of external auditor and monitoring compliance to regulations. The 
research suggests that a larger audit committee is more likely to enhance its status and power 
within an organisation and demand higher audit quality (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). Pincus 
et al. (1989) suggested that larger audit committees will be more likely to discover potential 
problems through increase in resources, which would enable them to help improve the quality 
15 
 
of its oversight (Chen and Zhoe, 2007; Demski, 2003) and subsequently lead to better 
performance. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis H6a can be specified as: 
H6a: An increase in the number of audit committee members could have a positive 
effect on the performance of Islamic banks. 
 
3. Methodology, Variables and Data 
3.1 Sample 
The study began by extracting data on Islamic banks listed in the Bankscope database. 
Although the Bankscope database is considered to be the most comprehensive database for 
banking, it has certain limitations regarding Islamic banking (for details, see Čihák and 
Hesse, 2010). However, the database provides standardised figures such that most of the 
items are comparable across time and banks (Olson, and Zoubi, 2016). Furthermore, many 
recent studies (i.e., Abedifar et al., 2016; Ashraf et al., 2016; Mollah et al., 2016; Olson, and 
Zoubi, 2016) used Bankscope as a reliable source for Islamic bank data. However, the 
classification for Islamic banks in the Bankscope database is incorrect in places; therefore, all 
banks included in the sample have been cross-verified with their websites and respective 
central banks to ensure accuracy. This classification produces a sample of 137 unique Islamic 
banks. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In accordance with previous studies (e.g., Mollah et al. 2016; Mollah, and Zaman, 2015; 
Olson and Zoubi, 2016), data on HCI and bank governance is hand-collected using various 
sources such as bank annual reports, governance reports, quarterly reports, civic 
announcements, press releases, CEO/Chairman speeches, websites, Bloomberg and other 
publicly available resources i.e., local newspapers. Initially, the disclosed data was collected 
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in the local currencies. The data was converted into US dollars for analysis using the Pacific 
Exchange Rate Service for FX conversion. To ensure data accuracy, observations were 
discarded where information could not be retrieved. Subject to these constraints, the final 
sample consists of 273 observations from 2005 to 2010 belonging to 47 unique Islamic banks 
(see Table 1 for details). For analysis, the sample period was further divided into pre- (2005–
2006), during- (2007–2008) and post-crisis (2009–2010) periods. This classification of the 
financial crisis was informed by the previous literature in which Aebi et al. (2012), Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012) and Bourkhi and Nabi (2013) defined the financial crisis period as July 
2007–December 2008, whereas Brunnermeier (2009) defined the crisis period as October 
2007–October 2008. Erkens et al. (2012) argued that the crisis period ended in the third 
quarter of 2008 with government intervention on a massive scale to bail out banks. In 
accordance with Peña and Villasalero (2010), the sample was divided into sub-periods to 
analyse the impact of changes in market conditions on IBs’ investment strategies. 
 
3.2 Variables 
The main variable of interest in this study is the market-based performance of Islamic banks. 
In accordance with previous bank performance literature (i.e., Adams and Mehran, 2012; 
Andres and Vallelado, 2008), a distinct performance measure, Tobin’s Q, was employed to 
measure the market value of IBs. Tobin’s Q is a dynamic, forward-looking measure of firm-
level economic performance, which reflects the stock market’s expectations about the future 
growth and profitability potential of the company (Kor and Mahoney, 2005). Tobin’s Q is 
computed as the sum of the market capitalisation and the book value of liabilities divided by 
total assets. 
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Considerable empirical evidence suggests that investments in human capital have a 
positive effect on firm performance (Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Dotzel et al., 2013; Kor and 
Mahoney, 2005; Prajogo et al., 2016; Skaggs and Youndt, 2004; Tharenou et al., 2007). In 
accordance with previous studies (e.g., Blatter et al., 2012; Dube et al., 2010; Knoke and 
Kalleberg, 1994; Muehlemann and Pfeifer, 2012), the total investments in human capital 
(HCI) are calculated as the ratio of total staff training and recruitment expenditure to total 
assets. Investment intensity variables can be calculated as the ratio of investments to total 
number of employees or total assets (Bryant and Javalgi, 2016). Following Kor and Mahoney 
(2005), total investment in human capital are standardised by total assets because some banks 
do not have available data on number of employees. As discussed in section 2 above, this 
measurement is argued to be a better measure than employee tenure, because financial 
resources are deemed essential for long-term human capital accumulation through training 
and recruitment programmes (Crook et al., 2011). 
Note that no disclosure of investments in human capital (HCI) is specifically required 
by accounting standards, banking laws or stock exchange reporting requirements where the 
sampled banks are incorporated. Consequently, there is little details or consistent disclosure 
of HCI contained within financial statements of sampled Islamic banks. All such data is 
hand-collected using the said resources. In this paper, investments in human capital (HCI) 
refer to the total estimated revenues paid to vendors for training (e.g., internal staff training, 
investments in degree programmes, including Shariah education, and non-degree-related 
external training) and recruitment expenditure in 47 Islamic banks over 2005–2010. Total 
assets to control for size bias further scale total training and recruitment expenditure. Becker 
(1975) argues that firms attain and sustain competitive advantage when they expand and 
acquire knowledge assets through investing in human capital and encourages to use a proxy 
that captures investments in knowledge assets comprehensively. In addition to Becker’s 
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suggestion, the proxy is appropriate for this study because majority of the selected banks 
make no segregation between training and recruitment expenditure. All such expenses are 
disclosed as a total expenditure on training and recruitment. Some banks provide additional 
notes briefly outlining the areas of investment i.e. internal/external training, recruitment etc. 
but no accurate costs allocated to each activity. A summary of the operationalisation of the 
variables is provided in Appendix 1. 
Several firm-related control variables were also employed as suggested by the extant 
literature ( Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; 
Erkens et al., 2012) to explain the potentially confounding effects of bank-specific 
characteristics. Among firm-specific variables, the size of the bank significantly influences 
the performance. Larger banks enjoy a superior franchise value and can use diversification as 
a tool for investment in organisational resources (Abedifar et al. 2016). Larger banks may 
also use different technologies and business models for their operations (Ashraf et al. 2016). 
Thus, bank performance may vary across banks of different size. Equally, longer established 
banks may enjoy performance advantages over relative newly incorporated banks (Beck et 
al., 2005), therefore, it is imperative to control for bank age. Leverage is another important 
factor in explaining bank performance (Beck et al., 2013; Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). Berger 
and Bouwman (2013) observed a strong relationship between leverage and a bank’s 
probability of survival and market share at all times (during banking crises, market crises, and 
normal times) and Grove et al. (2011) reported a significant negative relationship between 
leverage and the performance of US commercial banks during a crisis. Similarly, firms with a 
larger number of existing subsidiaries have complex business structures, and their investment 
portfolios are more diverse than those of their counterparts (Bushman et al., 2004). The 
governance mechanism of such firms is also different from others; this has a direct impact on 
firm performance (Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007). The prior research suggests that this type 
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of auditor is perceived as very important in the capital markets (Mansi et al., 2004), which 
could be used a proxy for audit quality to predict bank failure (Jin et al., 2011). Similarly, the 
Gulf region, as the birthplace of Islamic banking and teeming with petro-dollars from Muslim 
majority countries, serves as an ideal market for Islamic banks. Previous studies have 
reported performance differences between Islamic banks operating in Gulf and non-Gulf 
countries (Mollah et al., 2016; Murjan and Ruza, 2002). Finally, recalling the developed and 
developing economy argument, banks operating in the former economic regimes may follow 
different investment strategies and achieve different level of performance as a consequence 
(Claessens et al., 2001). Higher HCI may be due to the size of a bank or due to the market 
condition (Beck et al., 2000). Following Bryant and Javalgi, (2016), country-level clustering 
is performed by dividing the sample into developed and developing economies to control for 
the impact of economic regime. 
All the firm-related variables discussed above are employed to explain the potentially 
confounding effects of bank-specific characteristics on performance. Table 2 provides a 
summary of operationalisation for all the control variables included in the regression analysis. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics viz. mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 
skewness and kurtosis for all variables used in the main analysis. 
The overall market performance of sampled IBs in all four periods is sound with 
stable Tobin’s Q scores of 1.01, 1.02, 1.0 and 1.0, respectively, suggesting that investors’ 
confidence in IBs remained unshaken during the study period. The positive Q-ratio suggests 
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that sampled Islamic banks sustained strong market valuation at all times, including the 
financial crisis period.. Regarding the continuous independent variables, it can be observed 
that the average investments in human capital slightly increased from 0.09 in pre-crisis to 
0.12 during-crisis but later decreased to 0.07 in post crisis period, respectively.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In terms of corporate governance-related variables, no significant fluctuations can be 
observed except for the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). The average size of the SSB 
slightly decreased to 4.2 during-crisis as compare to all other periods. Regarding the firm-
related variables, it can be observed that the average firm size decreased during the crisis, 
indicating the impact of the crisis; however, an increase in the post-crisis period suggests 
market adjustment. Leverage and number of subsidiaries has constantly decreased on average 
during and after the crisis. All other firm-related variables have largely remained unchanged. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation results between the dependent variable Tobin’s Q 
and the independent variables. Tobin’s Q is positively related to HCI post-crisis, indicating a 
strong relationship between investments in human capital and the market value of IBs. None 
of the governance-specific variables are found to be associated with the market-based 
performance of IBs at any of the times. 
The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all regressions is also computed for all 
regressions to check for multicollinearity (column 2). The highest value of VIF is 3.93, 3.78, 
and 3.26 in pre-, during- and post-crisis period, respectively, well below the conventional 
value of 10 (Salama and Putnam, 2013). Likewise, the lowest value of tolerance is 1.15, 1.07 
and 1.17 for all three periods, well above the conventional value of 0.1. Hence, there is no 
multicollinearity between the independent variables. 
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4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Empirical model 
Alternative versions of the following model (Eq. 1) have been used to test the extended 
hypotheses. 
𝑀𝐵𝑃 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐻𝐶𝐼 +  𝛽2𝐶𝐺 (𝐿𝑛𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑆𝐵 +  𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 +  𝑁𝐸𝐷 +  𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐶𝑆)
+   𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀 (𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝐹𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 +  𝑆𝑢𝑏 +  𝐵𝐼𝐺4 +  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 
+  𝐷𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛) +  𝜀 
where MBP denotes market-based performance measure, Tobin’s Q; HCI is the ratio of total 
staff training and the recruitment expenditure to total assets, CG, includes all five measures of 
corporate governance variables. FIRM includes all seven firm-specific control variables. 
The model is used to analyse the effect of (i) investments on human capital; (ii) 
governance structure (board size, SSB size, CEO power (role duality), board independence 
(NED), and audit committee size); and (iii) firm characteristics (firm size, firm age, level of 
risk, firm complexity, type of auditor, operating region and economic regime) on the market-
based performance of IBs using Tobin’s Q as proxies. 
 
4.2.1 Do investments in human capital and corporate governance affect IBs’ market 
performance?  
Table 5 presents the results for the investments in human capital and the performance of IBs. 
To estimate the market value of sampled IBs in the pre-, during- and post-financial crisis 
periods, parsimonious versions of Eq. 1 have been used. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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As can be observed in the third column of Table 5, the relationship between market 
performance measurement (Tobin’s Q) and investments in human capital is positively and 
significantly related at the 1% level during the study period. As expected, the result is 
consistent with prior studies for conventional banks (e.g.,  Holland, 2010; Olson and Zoubi, 
2016). Hence, hypothesis H1 is supported. Similarly, HCI relates positively with Tobin’s Q at 
the 1% and 5% levels in the pre- and post-crisis periods, respectively. Hence, the results 
suggest that investment in human capital also helped IBs sustain market performance before 
and after the financial crisis. The results lend support to the argument of Tharenou et al. 
(2007) that firms yield higher performance through investments in human capital. Equally, 
the results indicate that IBs’ willingness and ability to make investments in human capital in 
varying marketing environments enabled them to appropriate much of the value created by 
their human capital pool (Molloy and Barney, 2015). 
In terms of corporate governance variables, the regression results indicate a 
significant positive association between board size and Tobin’s Q at all times. Hence, the 
evidence supports hypothesis H2a. This finding is consistent with that of Adams and Mehran 
(2012), who also found a significant positive relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q. 
Interestingly, SSB size is only significantly related with the market value of sampled IBs at 
the 10% level during the financial crisis period, indicating that an increase in the number of 
SSB members has a negative effect on the market performance of Islamic banks. Hence, there 
is not enough statistically significant evidence to support hypothesis H3b. The statistically 
significant negative relationship during the crisis at the 10% level, suggests that the market 
perceives IBs with larger SSBs less favourably. These findings are contrary to those reported 
by Mollah and Zaman (2015), who found a positive relationship between SSB size and the 
performance of IBs. Strikingly, CEO power (role duality) was found to be positively 
associated with Tobin’s Q. Hence, the finding that CEO duality has a positive impact on the 
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market performance of Islamic banks supports hypothesis H4a. Similar trends were observed 
in the pre- and during-crisis periods. This finding is inconsistent with that reported by Krause 
et al. (2014). However, no significance in the relationships was found in the post-crisis 
period. The result indicated board independence and audit committee size to be insignificant 
at all times. The former result is inconsistent with that reported by Andres and Vallelado 
(2008). Thus, there is insufficient statistically significant evidence to support hypotheses 
H5a-b and H6a. 
With respect to firm-related control variables, firm size and firm age positively relate 
to market performance, while the level of risk and firm complexity negatively relate to the 
market performance of IBs at all times. These findings are consistent with those of Mollah et 
al. (2016), Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2015) and Grove et al. (2011) in the context of Islamic 
and conventional banks, respectively. Similarly, the type of auditor (positively) relate to 
Tobin’s Q. This finding indicates that IBs audited by Big4 firms had a perceived higher 
market valuation. Lastly, economic regime (positively) relates with Tobin’s Q. 
 
5. Discussion of findings 
The regression results suggest that investments in human capital led the sampled IBs to 
achieve sustained market performance in the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. Hence, it 
is argued that, with the development of human capital through investment, an IB’s ability to 
merchandise its talents improves, resulting in stable market performance. This interface finds 
support in the earlier studies (Bosma et al., 2004; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Holland, 2010), 
which reported that human capital contributes both directly and indirectly to business 
performance in the banking sector. IBs’ strategy to rely on long-term human capital 
accumulation can be viewed as idiosyncratic problem-solving knowledge capital. Thus, the 
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results suggest that the financial crisis may have spurred the impact of investments in human 
capital on the market performance of IBs. 
These findings add to previous work that has contributed to enhance the impact of 
investments in human capital on firm performance (e.g., Peña and Villasalero, 2010). 
Similarly, the results supplement the findings of De Saá Pérez and Falcón (2004), who 
observed that Spanish banks, which developed their pool of human capital, achieved a 
superior level of profitability. Therefore, as Islamic banks compete in dynamic global 
markets, it is essential for IBs to increasingly adopt ambidextrous strategies where 
exploration and exploitation capabilities are combined simultaneously (Ferraris et al., 2017). 
IBs’ focus on the development of their human capital through investments can be viewed as 
an ambidextrous strategy to optimise their human capital pool to preserve their ethical 
identity (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007) and current robust growth. 
These findings also lend empirical support to the earlier theoretical suggestions of 
Molloy and Barney (2015) that a firm’s willingness and ability to make investments in human 
capital enable the firm to appropriate much of the value created by the human capital. 
Consistent with Wang et al. (2009), it is interpreted that Islamic banks took advantage of the 
robust growth and continuously invested in their stock of human capital during the financial 
malaise to sustain the growth trends. Such investments were a source of competitive 
advantage for the sampled IBs, which helped them sustain their market performance (Morris 
et al., 2017; Saks and Burke‐Smalley, 2014). Consistent with Úbeda-García et al. (2013) and 
Úbeda-García et al. (2014), it is argued that IBs’ strategy to invest in human capital helped 
them to achieve differential positioning within the financial sector. Equally, IBs strategy to 
continuously invest in their stock of human capital may hint their commitment towards 
‘applied ethics’ to sustain their relationship with internal i.e. employees and external (e.g. 
depositors) stakeholders echoing (Berrone et al., 2007), who submit that firm’s commitment 
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to applied ethics improves firm performance, which ultimately results in an increased 
stakeholder satisfaction. 
The results show that larger board size asserts a positive effect on the market-based 
performance of IBs, which challenges mainstream studies on corporate governance in the 
banking sector where it is argued that as board size increases control and monitoring 
functions are impaired (e.g., Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2015; Pathan and Faff, 2013). 
Furthermore, the results are consistent with the findings of Adams and Mehran (2012) that 
performance increases with board size for complex organisations such as banks. Thus, the 
costs associated with the freeriding behaviour of directors (e.g., Coles et al., 2008) on large 
IB boards do not appear to outweigh the beneficial effects of large boards in IBs. Thus, it is 
argued that large board size is justified for IBs due to the complex nature of their business; 
IBs need expertise on both economic and Shariah-related issues. The analysis further 
suggests that, although the SSB is an integral part of the Islamic bank business model, having 
a larger SSB does not help IBs boost their market performance, possibly due to the market 
perceiving them as an additional expense in the presence of larger governing boards. This 
finding implies that a large SSB increases the costs of monitoring and communication, which, 
in turn, deteriorates the market performance of IBs, consistent with the ‘agency cost’ 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1993). The study also finds evidence that CEO power exerts a positive 
impact on the market-based performance of IBs. This finding indicates that IBs perform 
better when the CEO chairs the board. Thus, IBs could benefit from the unity of control that 
the powerful CEO would offer. These results elucidate and provide an alternative view to 
Mollah and Zaman (2015), who argue that CEO power has a negative impact on the 
performance of Islamic banks. 
Another important observation is that the Islamic banking sector is not a homogenous 
group. When Islamic banks first entered the sector five decades ago, they operated as full-
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fledged or standalone banks. After the 1990s, Islamic banks gained recognition as serious 
market competitors, and many conventional banks began to establish Islamic subsidiaries to 
take advantage of the high global demand for the Shariah-compliant products as well as to tap 
high net worth customers. However, studies examining the performance of Islamic banks 
often failed to consider the effect of adopting different business operational strategies, i.e., 
operating as a full-fledged bank or as an Islamic window (i.e., subsidiary of conventional 
banks), on Islamic banks’ performance. Therefore, it is imperative to perform further analysis 
by segregating the IBs to determine the association between investments in human capital, 
corporate governance and market performance of both sets of banks. 
 
5.1 Further analysis 
A homogeneity test is performed on the sampled IBs to divide them into fully Islamic banks 
and Islamic subsidiaries, based on their business strategy. The classification is informed by a 
detailed profile review of each bank using different sources such as the bank’s website and 
central banks linked to the individual bank. This is a crucial issue that have been largely 
overlooked by the previous studies in the context of Islamic banking. The classification of 
Islamic banks in full-fledged Islamic banks and Islamic Shariah windows (subsidiaries) is 
clearly articulated, informed by several resources. Each banks’ company profile is thoroughly 
analysed using its website, annual reports, governance reports and ownership structure. 
Similarly, the bank is cross verified with its respective central bank (in the country where the 
bank is based). To insure the classification, the profile of mother company (if any) and/or 
major institutional shareholder of the bank is also analysed in details using available 
resources. Additionally, in Bankscope database, some investment banks and Mudarabah 
companies are treated as ‘Islamic banks’. Such firms do not perform the intermediary role 
(i.e. accepting deposits and lending) hence, shall not be treated as intermediary financial 
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institutions. All such firms are excluded from the sample to ensure the comparison is between 
banks, offering full-fledged banking services not Mudarabah or investment companies, per 
se. 
Based on this through analysis, a fully-fledged Islamic bank incorporate to a full 
service intermediary financial institution (Islamic bank) that conducts its business in 
accordance with the Shariah law and as such does not deals in conventional banking business 
simultaneously. Whereas subsumed under Islamic Shariah Windows are all those extended 
hands of various conventional banking groups that offer Islamic finance services alongside 
conventional banking as their core business or banks offering Shariah-compliant products 
where conventional bank is the major institutional shareholder. 
From the initial sample of 47 Islamic banks, 30 banks were found to be involved in 
Islamic banking and hence are treated as full-fledged Islamic banks. However, 17 banks were 
found to be the subsidiaries or extended branches of conventional banks offering full-fledged 
banking services albeit Sharia compliant under the management of a conventional bank; 
hence, such banks were treated as Islamic Shariah-windows (ISW). 
Based on the new classification, truncated versions of Eq. 1 are used to estimate the 
effects on investments in human capital and corporate governance features on the market-
based performance of both sets of IBs. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
As can be observed in the second to fifth columns of Table 6, full-fledged Islamic banks 
possess strong market valuation at all times, except during a crisis. Thus, it is again 
interpreted that investments in human capital are the main value drivers for the sustained 
market growth of these banks. Furthermore, a large board, small SSB, large firm size, firm 
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age and developed economic regime, manifests the market value of full-fledged Islamic 
banks. 
In contrast, no significant relationship between HCI and the market value of Islamic 
Shariah-windows can be observed (the results reported in the sixth to ninth columns of Table 
6), except for the full study period. It is interesting to observe that the market performance of 
ISW is driven by CEO duality, a large SSB, large firm size, a lower number of subsidiaries, 
big-four auditors and to a lesser extent, operating region being the Gulf-state counties. 
Segregate analysis of sampled Islamic banks proves the resilience of full-fledged 
Islamic banks at all times; in contrast, ISWs are not immune from the crisis. Albeit shallow 
statistical significance, the negative association between corporate governance-features and 
Tobin’s Q merits further analysis. 
According to Shariah law, which underpins Islamic banking, governance in Islamic 
banking is to achieve social equality and create more value for the society at large, while the 
conventional governance model focuses on wealth maximisation for shareholders. This 
finding infers that both sets of banking are expected to invest in their resource base, i.e., 
human capital, differently and are governed differently; hence, they achieve different levels 
of market performance. Therefore, to capture the strength of the IB’s governance system, in 
accordance with previous studies (i.e., Larcker et al., 2007; Lara et al., 2009), the individual 
governance characteristics are combined to create a composite governance quality variable. 
Specifically, the corporate governance quality measure is based on board size, SSB size, CEO 
power, board independence and audit committee size. In accordance with the procedures 
adopted by earlier research (e.g., Hudaib and Cooke, 2005; Salama and Putnam, 2013), an 
indicator variable is developed that captures the individual governance mechanisms of 
sampled IBs. Specifically, an Islamic bank is coded 1 for strong governance if 
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a) total number of directors serving on the board is between 5-7, 0 otherwise; 
b) total members serving on the Shariah Supervisory Board equals 3, 0 otherwise; 
c) the positions of the CEO and chairman of the board are separate, 0 otherwise; 
d) 60% of the board’s directors are non-executive directors, 0 otherwise; and 
e) total members serving on the audit committee equals 3, 0 otherwise. 
To construct the composite governance measure, all five dichotomous measures for each 
Islamic bank are summed to create a dichotomous variable. Specifically, for each year, an IB 
is coded 1 (for strong governance) if the sum of its five dichotomous measures equals 4 or 
higher, 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, it is important to consider the effect of size on bank’s investment strategies. 
Larger banks may invest less than small banks in their human capital than their size would 
imply. Accordingly, a dichotomous variable for firm size (FSize) is computed. Specifically, 
for each year, an IB is coded 1 (for large) if the sum of its FSize is equal or greater than that 
of the sample median, 0 otherwise. A four-by-four matrix is used to perform the interaction 
between dichotomous variable for corporate governance and FSize in that an IB is coded 1 
for strong governance and large size, and 0 for weak governance and small size. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 1 illustrates the interaction effect of corporate governance and bank size on the market 
based performance of both sets of Islamic banks. It can be observed that the market value of 
full-fledged Islamic banks increases with lax governance and large size, whereas ISW’s 
market value increases with strong corporate governance, whether the size is large or small. 
The former finding suggests that, despite the lax governance, large full-fledged Islamic banks 
tend to invest more in human capital, which in turn results in higher market performance. 
Hence, the market value of full-fledged banks is closely tied with their size. Conversely, the 
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interaction effect observed for ISWs suggests that ISWs with a strong corporate governance 
structure tend to invest more in human capital, which results in higher market valuation. 
These results warrant further research in this area. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper is to identify whether investments in human capital (HCI) 
and corporate governance features have a significant impact on the market performance of 
Islamic banks while controlling for other firm-specific characteristics in the pre-, during- and 
post-financial crisis periods. The regression results based on HCI suggest that Islamic banks 
(IBs) have effectively invested in human capital, which helped them sustain strong market 
performance in the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. IBs’ focus on the development of 
their human capital through investments can be viewed as an ambidextrous strategy to 
optimise their human capital pool to preserve their ethical banking business model as well as 
the current robust growth. 
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the Islamic banking sector is not a 
homogeneous group. Based on their operating model, Islamic banks can be classified as full-
fledged Islamic banks or Islamic Shariah-windows (ISWs). The segregated analysis suggests 
that investments in human capital are significantly associated with the former group of 
banking at all times, whereas shallow statistical significance between HCI and market 
performance of ISWs across three periods is observed. The disadvantage of operating as an 
ISW is that they need to spend more on training and recruitment of staff and management and 
expend higher marketing costs to attract and convince customers of their ethical status, 
which, in turn, may affect their market performance. 
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A further analysis suggests that the market value of full-fledged Islamic banks 
increases with lax governance and large size, whereas ISWs’ market value increases with 
strong corporate governance and large or small bank size. This analysis implies that 
investments in organisational resources (i.e., human capital) are driven by bank size rather 
than by the governance mechanism. However, this aspect needs further exploration. Further 
studies may consider the management (i.e., CEO) profiles while analysing the impact of 
organisational investments strategies and performance outcomes. 
The study makes a significant contribution to research by examining the impact of 
investments in human capital and corporate governance features on the market value of 47 
Islamic banks operating in different countries for the 2005–2010 period, while controlling for 
firm-specific variables. 
The findings also have important implications for those managing and monitoring the 
Islamic finance sector, as they need to critically analyse and reflect on these determinants to 
design strategies and mechanisms that will enable their banks to compete effectively and to 
maintain their competitive advantage in the market. These findings have important 
implications for managers of conventional banks (CBs). In the context of significant erosion 
of trust in the interest based conventional banking system, the insights provided into the 
Islamic ethical banking model could guide the managers of CBs how to achieve consistency 
between the brand values and staff behaviour to improve their relationship with stakeholders 
and restore trust. Finally, these findings have important implications for academics and 
researchers in the area, as they pave the way for further investigation. 
The paper is not without limitations. First, it did not include and control for macro-
economic factors such as GDP and inflation in assessing bank performance. Hence, future 
studies may add these factors in the model. Second, the paper includes Islamic banks only; 
future research may undertake a comparative study with conventional banks. Finally, this 
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study used an economic measure for HCI; the future research may use a combination of 
economic and non-economic measures such as level of education and employee tenure. 
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Table 1 
Sample description 
Country Bank name 
Economic 
regime 
Full-fledged 
Islamic banks 
Islamic Shariah-
windows 
Full sample 
(all banks) 
Observations 
Percentage 
(%) 
Bahrain 
Al Baraka Banking Group, Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain, 
Bahrain Islamic Bank, Gulf Finance House BSC, 
Ithmaar Bank, Khaleeji Commercial Bank 
Developed 4 2 6 35 13 
Bangladesh 
Al-Arafah Islami Bank, Exim Bank, First Security 
Islami Bank, ICB Islamic Bank, Islami Bank 
Bangladesh, Shahjalal Islami Bank, Social Islami Bank 
Developing 4 3 7 42 15 
Egypt 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank Egypt, Al Baraka Bank 
Egypt, Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 
Developing 3 0 3 18 7 
Indonesia Panin Bank Syariah Developing 0 1 1 4 1 
Jordan Jordan Islamic bank, Safwa Islamic bank Developing 1 1 2 12 4 
Kuwait 
Ahli United Bank KSC, Boubyan Bank KSC, Kuwait 
Finance House, Kuwait International Bank 
Developed 2 2 4 24 9 
Malaysia Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, BIMB Holdings Berhad Developed 1 1 2 12 4 
Nigeria Jaiz Bank Developing 1 0 1 6 2 
Pakistan BankIslami Pakistan Limited, Meezan Bank Developing 2 0 2 12 4 
Qatar 
Masraf Al Rayan, Qatar First Banks, Qatar 
International Islamic Banks, Qatar Islamic Banks 
Developed 4 0 4 22 8 
Saudi Arabia 
Al Rajhi Bank, Alinma Bank, Bank AlBilad, Bank Al-
Jazira 
Developed 4 0 4 22 8 
Sudan 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan, Al Shamal Islamic Bank, Blue 
Nile Mahsreg Bank, Sudanese French Bank   
Developing 2 2 4 24 9 
Turkey Albaraka Türk Katılım Bankası A.Ş. Developed 0 1 1 6 2 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Ajman Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, Emirates Islamic 
bank, Sharjah Islamic Bank 
Developed 2 2 4 23 8 
United 
Kingdom 
Al Rayan Bank PLC (formerly Islamic Bank of 
Britain), Bank of London and the Middle East 
Developed 0 2 2 11 4 
 
Total 
    
 
30 
 
17 
 
47 
 
273 
 
100 
The table describes the sample of the study. The study considers 47 banks (30 fully-fledged Islamic banks and 17 Islamic Shariah-windows) over 15 countries for the period 
of 2005–2010. The country-wise distribution of the banks, economic regime, observations, and percentage are given in columns 2–8. 
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Table 2 
Summary of operationalisation for control variables 
Variable Proxy  Reference 
Firm size Log of total asset Abedifar et al. (2016); Ashraf et 
al. (2016); Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012); Mollah et al. (2016); 
Palvia et al. (2015). 
Firm age Number of years since 
incorporation 
Anderson and Reeb (2003); Beck 
et al. (2005); Kor and Mahoney 
(2005); Kotha et al. (2011). 
Risk Leverage Abedifar et al. (2013); 
Fahlenbrach et al. (2012); Grove 
et al. (2011); Mollah et al. (2016). 
Firm complexity No of subsidiaries Bushman et al. (2004); Markarian 
and Parbonetti (2007). 
Auditor type Dummy 
(Big4 vs. non-Big4) 
Jin et al. (2011); Mansi et al. 
(2004). 
Operating region 
 
Dummy 
(Gulf vs. Non-gulf) 
Mollah et al. (2016); Murjan and 
Ruza (2002). 
Economic regime Dummy 
(developed vs. developing regime) 
Beck et al. (2000); Claessens et al. 
(2001). 
Notes: Firm-size (FSize) = log of total assets; Firm age (Fage) = number of years since 
incorporation; Level of risk (Risk) = using leverage as proxy (total debt/ total assets); Firm 
complexity (Sub) = total number of existing subsidiaries; Type of auditor (BIG4) = big four 
vs. non-big four, Operating region (Region) = 1 if the bank is based in Gulf-region, 0 
otherwise and Economic regime (DEcon) = 1 if the bank is based in developed economy, 0 
otherwise. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of performance measure and continuous independent variables 
 
 
Panel A: Full-study period (2005-2010) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Tobin's Q 1.012 0.095 0.811 1.326 1.701 15.326 
HCI 0.090 0.237 0.004 1.306 0.227 2.401 
LnBSize 2.203 0.442 1.609 3.773 2.174 8.833 
LnSSB 4.306 1.355 2 7 0.409 2.388 
CEOpower 0.144 0.351 0 1 2.031 5.124 
NED 0.705 0.249 0.222 1 -0.483 1.988 
LnACS 1.158 0.127 1.032 1.386 1.173 2.562 
LnFSize 14.593 1.971 10.787 19.836 0.421 3.856 
Fage 19.206 13.193 3 53 0.422 2.072 
Risk 41.620 21.149 4.369 77.068 -0.045 1.909 
Sub 5.759 6.488 0 19 0.878 2.362 
Big4 0.813 0.391 0 1 -1.601 3.564 
Region 0.319 0.467 0 1 0.778 1.605 
DEcon 0.813 0.391 0 1 -1.601 3.564 
 
Panel B: Pre-crisis (2005-2006) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Tobin's Q 1.021 0.088 0.834 1.326 0.763 6.060 
HCI 0.091 0.238 0.004 1.307 0.244 2.341 
LnBSize 2.193 0.437 1.609 3.773 1.991 8.564 
LnSSB 4.305 1.378 2 7 0.456 2.390 
CEOpower 0.141 0.349 0 1 2.068 5.275 
NED 0.701 0.251 0.143 1 -0.487 1.993 
LnACS 1.158 0.126 1.032 1.386 1.213 2.646 
LnFSize 14.723 1.888 10.787 19.836 0.322 4.053 
Fage 19.094 13.144 3 53 0.413 2.043 
Risk 43.169 21.311 4.369 77.116 -0.095 1.874 
Sub 5.961 6.304 0 19 0.918 2.551 
Big4 0.813 0.392 0 1 -1.601 3.564 
Region 0.313 0.465 0 1 0.809 1.655 
DEcon 0.820 0.385 0 1 -1.669 3.784 
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Panel C: During-crisis (2007-2008) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Tobin's Q 1.001 0.123 0.792 1.760 3.610 24.223 
HCI 0.124 0.333 0.007 2.264 0.120 2.185 
LnBSize 2.217 0.456 1.609 3.773 2.366 8.942 
LnSSB 4.297 1.256 2 7 0.443 2.637 
CEOpower 0.141 0.350 0 1 2.068 5.275 
NED 0.707 0.241 0.25 1 -0.492 2.034 
LnACS 1.154 0.125 1.032 1.386 1.253 2.770 
LnFSize 14.332 2.062 10.787 19.836 0.583 3.523 
Fage 19.406 13.404 3 53 0.433 2.103 
Risk 41.048 20.990 4.369 77.068 0.017 2.028 
Sub 5.766 6.414 0 19 0.755 2.201 
Big4 0.813 0.393 0 1 -1.601 3.564 
Region 0.344 0.479 0 1 0.658 1.433 
DEcon 0.797 0.406 0 1 -1.476 3.178 
 
Panel D: Post-crisis (2009-2010) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Tobin's Q 1.009 0.087 0.811 1.326 0.058 4.862 
HCI 0.073 0.180 0.003 0.736 0.238 2.559 
LnBSize 2.205 0.444 1.609 3.773 2.243 8.970 
LnSSB 4.3125 1.390349 2 7 0.347 2.271 
CEOpower 0.148 0.357 0 1 1.978 4.911 
NED 0.708 0.252 0.222 1 -0.473 1.955 
LnACS 1.160 0.130 1.032 1.386 1.098 2.392 
LnFSize 14.593 2.008 10.787 19.836 0.455 3.953 
Fage 19.219 13.238 3 53 0.424 2.082 
Risk 40.357 21.134 4.369 76.296 -0.029 1.889 
Sub 5.555 6.746 0 19 0.909 2.281 
Big4 0.813 0.392 0 1 -1.601 3.564 
Region 0.313 0.465 0 1 0.809 1.655 
DEcon 0.813 0.392 0 1 -1.601 3.564 
Notes: Tobin’s Q = market capitalization + total liabilities/ total assets. HCI = ratio of total staff training and recruitment expenditure to total assets [HCI/total assets]. Board-size (BSize) = log of total 
number of directors on board; Size of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) = log of total number of Shariah advisors; CEO-power (role duality) = dichotomous; yes/no; Board-composition (NED) = fraction 
of non-executive directors (NED) on the board to total board size; Size of audit committee (ACS) = log of total number of members serving on audit committee. Firm size (FSize) = log of total assets; Firm 
age (Fage) = number of years since incorporation; Level of risk (Risk) = using leverage as proxy (total debt/ total assets); Firm complexity (Sub) = total number of existing subsidiaries; Type of auditor 
(BIG4) = big four vs. non-big four, Operating region (Region) = 1 if the bank is based in the Gulf-region, 0 otherwise, and Economic regime (DEcon) = 1 if the bank is based in developed economy, 0 
otherwise.
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Table 4 
Correlation matrix 
Panel A: Pre-crisis (2005-2006) 
  VIF Tobin's Q HCI lnBSize lnSSB CEOpower NED LnACS lnACS Fage Risk Sub Big4 Region 
HCI 1.17 0.0979 
            LnBSize 2.18 0.189 0.1237 
           LnSSB 1.97 -0.0337 0.0728 0.5489 
          CEOpower 1.19 -0.0817 0.1796 0.1847 0.1722 
         NED 3.93 0.1437 -0.2393 -0.3673 -0.1401 -0.2069 
        LnACS 1.81 -0.0772 0.0304 0.0179 -0.2074 -0.087 0.4414 
       LnFSize 1.37 0.0181 -0.1092 -0.1353 -0.1369 0.1465 0.311 0.0398 
      Fage 1.4 0.0024 0.063 -0.1022 -0.3503 -0.0218 -0.0698 -0.043 0.1023 
     Risk 2.79 0.1204 -0.1451 -0.4351 -0.1442 -0.1393 0.7204 0.0759 0.3269 0.0282 
    Sub 1.16 0.1406 -0.0992 -0.0614 -0.1681 0.0562 0.0588 0.0957 0.3114 0.1092 0.0368 
   Big4 2.06 0.095 -0.3268 -0.3749 -0.1121 -0.2663 0.4254 0.2258 0.0194 -0.261 0.2794 0.0289 
  Region 1.61 -0.0684 -0.162 -0.0855 -0.1374 -0.0788 -0.1967 -0.0074 -0.1216 0.1291 -0.2463 0.0552 0.3239 
 DEcon 1.15 0.0088 0.0362 -0.0713 -0.0444 0.0723 -0.0118 -0.0635 0.0639 -0.0106 0.146 0.0813 0.0358 -0.2113 
Panel B: During-crisis (2007-2008) 
 
VIF Tobin's Q HCI lnBSize lnSSB CEOpower NED LnACS lnACS Fage Risk Sub Big4 Region 
HCI 1.07 0.0421 
            LnBSize 2.43 -0.1837 0.1911 
           LnSSB 2.05 -0.1815 0.0838 0.5613 
          CEOpower 1.14 -0.1845 0.1858 0.2631 0.1561 
         NED 3.78 0.3638 -0.1626 -0.422 -0.0979 -0.2071 
        LnACS 1.77 0.2915 0.0433 0.0308 -0.1449 -0.0768 0.3951 
       LnFSize 1.52 0.2614 -0.0893 -0.2307 -0.0507 -0.0842 0.3786 0.0119 
      Fage 1.56 0.0033 -0.0993 -0.1336 -0.3656 -0.009 -0.154 -0.0842 -0.1294 
     Risk 2.44 0.2315 -0.0907 -0.4451 -0.228 -0.0846 0.6168 -0.0347 0.3936 -0.0179 
    Sub 1.32 -0.1084 0.0966 -0.1326 -0.0346 0.0078 -0.1099 -0.075 0.1987 -0.0463 0.1033 
   Big4 2.34 0.2614 -0.1506 -0.4145 -0.2068 -0.2663 0.4271 0.2146 -0.0376 -0.2592 0.2319 0.0578 
  Region 1.7 -0.125 -0.0677 -0.096 -0.1724 -0.1035 -0.1639 0.1328 -0.2703 0.1931 -0.2439 0.1249 0.3477 
 DEcon 1.37 -0.063 -0.0315 -0.2357 -0.1602 -0.0192 0.045 -0.0917 -0.0381 0.0008 0.2834 0.2744 0.255 -0.0434 
Panel C: Post-crisis (2009-2010) 
 
VIF Tobin's Q HCI lnBSize lnSSB CEOpower NED LnACS lnACS Fage Risk Sub Big4 Region 
HCI 1.22 0.0298 
            LnBSize 2.15 -0.017 0.278 
           LnSSB 1.86 0.0427 0.2513 0.526 
          CEOpower 1.17 -0.027 0.1622 0.2288 0.0803 
         NED 3.26 0.0015 -0.2762 -0.4197 -0.0922 -0.2034 
        LnACS 1.68 -0.0195 -0.1829 -0.0376 -0.1918 -0.0998 0.4151 
       LnFSize 1.31 0.0227 -0.2224 -0.1604 -0.0832 -0.0731 0.2511 -0.005 
      Fage 1.35 -0.0547 -0.0307 -0.1152 -0.3049 -0.0403 -0.0723 -0.0187 0.0248 
     Risk 2.1 0.0102 -0.1515 -0.4062 -0.1939 -0.0921 0.6192 0.0066 0.3008 0.0312 
    Sub 1.26 -0.0332 -0.0332 0.1136 -0.0522 -0.1751 -0.1005 0.0925 0.2554 0.1309 -0.111 
   Big4 2.11 0.0479 -0.3857 -0.4009 -0.1373 -0.2498 0.4312 0.2269 0.1151 -0.2577 0.2273 -0.0586 
  Region 1.69 0.0354 -0.131 -0.091 -0.1156 -0.0444 -0.2278 0.0178 -0.0231 0.123 -0.2427 0.0723 0.3239 
 DEcon 1.25 0.0795 -0.1064 -0.1441 -0.1951 0.0317 -0.0217 -0.1311 -0.0604 -0.0361 0.1302 0.0367 0.0256 -0.2375 
Notes: *** p<0.01 Correlation is in bold. 
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Table 5 
Cross-sectional OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on HCI, corporate governance features and 
control variables for Islamic banks 
  
All Islamic Banks 
Predicted Full period Pre-crisis During-crisis Post-crisis 
sign (2005-2010) (2005-2006) (2007-2008) (2009-2010) 
N   273 89 92 92 
HCI + 0.394*** 0.437*** 0.284 0.528** 
LnBSize +/- 0.197*** 0.134* 0.212** 0.358*** 
LnSSB +/- -0.0083 0.0168 -0.0251* -0.0093 
CEOpower +/- 0.0846*** 0.110** 0.0868* 0.0507 
NED +/- 0.0269 0.0951 -0.0314 0.0923 
LnACS + 0.0684 0.142 0.0109 0.153 
LnFSize + 0.0863*** 0.0831*** 0.0740*** 0.0956*** 
Fage + 0.00531*** 0.00581*** 0.00442** 0.00748*** 
Risk - -0.00291*** -0.00396*** -0.0012 -0.00429*** 
Sub +/- -0.00304* -0.00458** -0.0011 -0.0047 
Big4 +/- 0.161*** 0.187*** 0.136* 0.155* 
Region +/- -0.0373 -0.0602 -0.038 -0.0271 
DEcon +/- 0.0773*** 0.0613 0.0431 0.109 
Constant   -1.111*** -1.109*** -0.811** -1.768*** 
Adj. R2   0.325 0.337 0.21 0.422 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6 
Cross-sectional OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on HCI, corporate governance features and 
control variables for Fully-fledged Islamic banks and Islamic Shariah-windows 
 
Full-fledged Islamic Banks Islamic (Shariah) Windows 
 
Full 
period 
Pre-
crisis 
During-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Full 
period 
Pre-
crisis 
During-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
 
(2005-
2010) 
(2005-
2006) 
(2007-
2008) 
(2009-
2010) 
(2005-
2010) 
(2005-
2006) 
(2007-
2008) 
(2009-
2010) 
N 173 53 60 60 100 32 34 34 
HCI 
0.447**
* 
0.537**
* 0.196 0.883** 0.358** 0.152 0.503 0.417 
LnBS
ize 
0.306**
* 0.253** 
0.386**
* 0.298* 
-
0.00160 -0.136 -0.121 0.343 
LnSS
B 
-
0.0270*
** 
-
0.00634 
-
0.0450*
** 
-
0.00275 
0.0600*
** 
0.112**
* 0.0306 0.0648 
CEOp
ower -0.0143 0.00932 0.0327 -0.121 
0.198**
* 0.170** 0.211** 0.215* 
NED 0.0503 0.0658 0.0549 0.0453 0.109 0.115 0.0396 0.142 
LnA
CS 0.00891 0.0250 0.0181 0.0786 0.0453 0.202 -0.0393 0.182 
LnFS
ize 
0.0976*
** 
0.0997*
** 
0.0781*
** 
0.0809*
** 
0.0965*
** 
0.105**
* 
0.0713*
* 0.190** 
Fage 
0.00590
*** 
0.00693
*** 
0.00533
** 0.00632 0.00227 0.00443 0.00117 0.00536 
Risk 
-
0.00221
*** 
-
0.00334
*** 
-
0.00085
5 
-
0.00287 
-
0.00562
*** 
-
0.00784
*** -0.00293 
-
0.0108*
* 
Sub 
-
0.00065
5 
-
0.00341 0.00114 
-
0.00227 
-
0.00816
** 
-
0.00473 -0.00512 
-
0.0198*
* 
Big4 
0.114 0.199** 0.0591 0.0729 
0.152**
* 0.0867 0.199** 0.324 
Regio
n -0.0386 -0.0490 -0.0428 
-
0.00783 0.104* 0.0870 0.0705 0.224 
DEco
n 
0.0923*
** 0.0879 0.0496 0.117 0.0883 -0.0224 0.0644 0.181 
Const
ant 
-
1.414**
* 
-
1.464**
* 
-
1.188**
* 
-
1.409** 
-
0.956** -0.938 -0.273 
-
3.239** 
Adj. 
R2 0.487 0.492 0.361 0.538 0.259 0.256 0.082 0.299 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1 
Plots of interaction effect of corporate governance & bank size on market performance 
 
Notes: SGLBS = strong governance & large bank size, WGLBS = weak governance & large bank size, SGSBS 
= strong governance & small bank size, WGSBS = weak governance & small bank size. 
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